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Abstract
Cross-country evidence is presented on resource dependence and the link between volatility and 
growth. First, growth depends negatively on volatility of unanticipated output growth 
independent of initial income per capita, the average investment share, initial human capital, trade 
openness, the national income share of natural resource exports and population growth. Second, 
the adverse effect of resources on growth operates primarily through higher volatility. The 
positive effect of resources on growth is positive, but can be swamped by the indirect negative
effect through volatility. Third, with well developed financial sectors, the resource curse is less 
pronounced. Fourth, landlocked countries with ethnic tensions have higher volatility and lower 
growth. Fifth, restrictions on the current account lead to higher volatility and lower growth, but 
capital account restrictions lower volatility and boost growth. These effects are especially strong 
in resource-rich countries. We also present IV-estimates to correct for the endogenous nature of 
investment rates and panel estimates to allow for possible changes in explanatory variables over 
time. Our key message is that volatility is a quintessential feature of the resource curse. 
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1. Introduction 
The key determinants of economic growth highlighted in the empirical literature  institutions, 
geography and culture – show far more persistence than the growth rates they are supposed to 
explain (Easterly, et al, 1993). One candidate to explain the volatility of growth in income per 
capita is the volatility of commodity prices. This includes not only oil, but also for example grain 
and coffee prices. What commodity prices lack in trend, they make up for in volatility (Deaton, 
1999). A recent detailed examination of the growth performance of 35 countries during the 
historical period 1870-1939 led to the following conclusions (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson, 
2007). Countries that specialize in commodities with substantial price volatility have more 
volatility in their terms of trade, enjoy less foreign direct investment and experience lower growth 
rates than countries that specialize in commodities with more stable prices or countries that are 
industrial leaders. Countries in the periphery with volatile commodity prices and undiversified 
economies fall behind in economic development. Also, the long-run volatility of the real 
exchange rate of developing countries is approximately three times bigger than that of 
industrialized countries (Haussmann, et al, 2004). Another study employs data for 83 countries 
over the period 1960-2000 and also finds robust evidence for a strong and negative link between 
real exchange rate volatility and growth performance after correcting for initial output per worker, 
enrolment in secondary education, trade openness, government consumption, inflation and even 
banking or currency crises (Aghion, et al, 2006). Furthermore, the adverse effect of exchange rate 
volatility on growth is weaker for countries with well developed financial systems.  
The pioneering work of Ramey and Ramey (1995) takes a different tack. It investigates 
the link between volatility of unanticipated output growth (rather than volatility of the terms of 
trade) and growth performance. It uses the Heston-Summers data to provide cross-country 
evidence for a negative link between volatility and mean growth rates controlling for initial 
income, population growth, human capital and physical capital. Interestingly, this study finds 
evidence for this negative link regardless of whether one includes the share of investment in 
national income or not. It also estimates the relationship between volatility and growth in a panel 
model that controls for both time and country fixed effects.  To allow for the time-varying nature 
of volatility, a measure of government spending volatility is used that is correlated with volatility 
of output across both time and countries. The negative link between volatility and growth seems 
robust to a large set of conceivable controls that vary with time period or country.
1 Another study 
1 However, Imbs (2006) shows that growth and volatility correlate positively across sectors. Within the 
context of a mean-variance portfolio setup, it is understandable that volatile sectors command higher 
investment rates and thus higher growth rates. 2
shows for a cross-section of 91 countries that policy variability in inflation and government 
spending exerts a strong and negative impact on growth (Fatás and Mihov, 2005). 
  Our main objective is to extend Ramey and Ramey (1995) by allowing for the direct
effect of natural resource abundance on growth and, more importantly, the indirect effect of 
natural resources on growth performance via volatility. We thus follow Blattman, Hwang and 
Williamson (2007) and allow for the role of natural resources on macroeconomic volatility. We 
allow natural resources, financial development, openness and distance from waterways to be the 
underlying determinants of volatility. They may be viewed as exogenous proxies for the volatility 
of the real exchange rate and thus of GDP growth. We also shed new light on the evidence for the 
resource curse given by Sachs and Warner (1997) and many others.
2 Our objective is to test 
whether any adverse indirect effect of natural resources on growth performance via volatility of 
unanticipated output growth dominates any adverse direct effect of natural resource abundance on 
economic growth. Inspired by Aghion, et al (2006), we test whether the adverse effect of natural 
resources on volatility and growth is weakened if there are well developed financial institutions. 
We also test whether being landlocked, ethnic tensions and restrictions on the current account 
boost volatility and curb growth and whether restrictions on the capital account and exchange 
controls reduce volatility and boost growth. To avoid omitted variable bias, we control for initial 
income per capita, population growth, investment rates and primary schooling on growth. 
Our econometric tests on the importance of volatility for the paradox of plenty are 
motivated by Figures 1–3 and by the data on average yearly growth and its standard deviation by 
country groups for the period 1970-2003 presented in Table 1. These data suggest five stylized 
facts that are essential for a new and improved understanding of the natural resource curse: 
x First, volatile countries with a high standard deviation of yearly growth in GDP per capita 
have on average lower growth in GDP per capita. Figure 1 illustrates this partial correlation 
while Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that this relationship holds even after controlling for 
initial income per capita, population growth, human capital and physical capital. 
x Second, developing countries suffer much more from volatility in output growth than 
developed countries. Whereas Western Europe and North America have a standard 
deviation of, respectively, 2.33 and 1.90 %-points of yearly growth in GDP per capita, the 
figures for Asia are 4.4 to 5 %-points and for Latin America & Caribbean 4.54%-point. 
Most striking is that Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East & North Africa have the 
2 The windfall resource revenues lead to appreciation of the real exchange rate and a decline of the non-
resource export sectors. If there is substantial loss in learning by doing in the non-resource export sectors, 
there will be a fall in total factor productivity growth as in Sachs and Warner (1995). Natural resources may 
also invite rapacious rent seeking and thus hamper growth. 3
highest volatility. Their standard deviations of average growth in GDP per capita are, 
respectively, 6.52 and 8.12 %-points. 
x Third, countries with poorly developed financial systems are much more volatile. Countries 
in the bottom quartile of financial development have a standard deviation of annual growth 
in GDP per capita 2 %-point higher than those in the top quartile. North America and 
Western Europe have well developed financial systems while Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia and especially South Asia and Middle East & North Africa have poor functioning 
financial systems. Resource-rich and landlocked economies have less developed financial 
systems than resource-poor countries.  
x Fourth, countries that depend a lot on natural resources are much more volatile than 
countries without natural resources. Countries with a share of natural resource exports in 
GDP greater than 19% (the top quartile) have a staggeringly high standard deviation of 
output growth of 7.37 %-point. For countries with a natural resource exports share of less 
than 5 per cent of GDP (the bottom quartile), the figure is only 2.83 %-point. Figure 2 also 
indicates that resource-rich countries have bigger macroeconomic volatility than resource-
poor countries. Figure 3 shows that world commodity prices are extremely volatile and are 
the main reason why natural resource export revenues are so volatile. Crude petroleum 
prices are more volatile than food prices and ores & metals prices. Volatility of raw 
agricultural product prices is less, but still substantial. Monthly price deviations of 10%-
points from their base level (year 2000) are quite normal. 
x Fifth, landlocked countries suffer much more from volatility than countries with easy access 
to waterways. Indeed, countries that are less than 49 kilometres from the nearest waterway 
have a standard deviation of growth in GDP per capita that is 1.6 %-point lower than 
countries that are more than 359 kilometres from the nearest waterway. Empirical work also 
finds that remote countries have less access to markets, less diversified exports and greater 
volatility of output growth (Malik and Temple, 2006). 
 Although these stylized facts are suggestive, they are merely partial correlations and do not 
permit any causal evidence. Hence, we perform a proper multivariate econometric analysis and 
control for all potential factors affecting the rate of economic growth. We also face the thorny 
issue of the endogenous nature of explanatory variables. 
  The sophisticated statistical decomposition analysis performed in Koren and Tenreyro 
(2007) suggests four possible reasons why poor countries are so much more volatile than rich 
countries: poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors; poor countries specialize in fewer 
sectors; poor countries experience more frequent and more severe aggregate shocks (e.g., from 4
macroeconomic policy); and macroeconomic fluctuations in poor countries are more highly 
correlated with the shocks of the sectors they specialize in. The evidence suggests that, as 
countries develop their economies, their productive structure shifts from more to less volatile 
sectors. Also, the degree of specialization declines in early stages of development and increases a 
little in later stages of development. Furthermore, the volatility of country-specific 
macroeconomic shocks falls with development. This decomposition analysis sheds interesting 
light on why poor economies are more volatile than rich economies. Our multivariate 
econometric analysis provides complimentary evidence on the factors affecting volatility. 
  We argue that crucial and strongly related sources of macroeconomic volatility and poor 
growth performance are lack of a sophisticated financial system, natural resource dependence, 
and whether a country is landlocked or not. We also provide evidence that economic restrictions 
and ethnic tensions play a role. Countries with a large dependence on natural resources and that 
are landlocked are typically not very diversified and vulnerable to highly volatile world 
commodity prices. Natural resource revenues tend to be very volatile (much more so than GDP), 
because the supply of natural resources exhibits low price elasticities of supply. Furthermore, as 
documented in Bloom and Sachs (1998) and indicated by Figure 4, Sub-Saharan Africa is most 
vulnerable to volatility of commodity prices as it depends so much on natural resources. Dutch 
Disease effects may also induce real exchange rate volatility and thus a fall in investment in 
physical capital and learning, and further contraction of the traded sector and lower productivity 
growth (e.g., Gylfason, et al, 1999; Herbertsson, et al, 2000). Volatile resource revenues are 
disliked by risk-averse households. The welfare losses induced by consumption risk are tiny 
compared with those resulting from imperfect financial markets. However, a recent dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium study of Zimbabwe highlights the incompleteness of financial 
markets and suggests that the observed volatility in commodity prices depresses capital 
accumulation and output by about 40 percent (Elbers, et al, 2007). 
Our paper gives a prominent role to the quality of financial markets in understanding how 
the volatility of commodity prices and natural resource export revenues might depress growth. 
We adapt the liquidity shock arguments put forward by Aghion, et al (2006). Effectively, larger 
natural resource revenues make it easier to overcome negative liquidity shocks. We thus show 
that more volatile commodity prices will harm innovation and growth. 
Section 2 discusses why volatility may harm output growth, especially in countries with 
poor financial systems. Since there are also reasons for volatility to boost growth, the issue needs 
to be settled empirically. Section 3 discusses our econometric methodology for the cross-country 
and the panel estimates. Section 4 presents our cross-country estimates and section 5 our panel 5
estimates. Section 6 uses our preferred estimates to perform a counterfactual experiment 
comparing resource-rich and landlocked Africa with the Asian Tigers. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Why Volatility of Natural Resource Revenues Might Hamper Growth? 
2.1. Economic arguments 
Aghion, et al (2006) shows that macroeconomic volatility driven by nominal exchange rate 
movements may stunt innovations and thus depress growth in economies with poorly developed 
financial institutions and nominal wages not reacting immediately to changes in prices. We adopt 
this argument to show that volatility in natural resource revenues, induced by volatility in primary 
commodity prices, curbs growth in economies with badly functioning financial systems. Let the 
law of one price holds, so that the price level Pt simply tracks the nominal exchange rate St. In 
other words, Pt = St Pt* where the foreign price level Pt* is normalized to unity. Nominal wages 
are pre-set not knowing the realization of the price level, that is Wt = I A t E[Pt] = I A t E[St], 
where At denotes productivity and I <1 is a constant. Output follows from the production function 
Yt = At lt, where lt denotes employment. Profits are St { At St lt  I At E[St] lt. The value of 
innovations the next period is Vt+1 = V Pt+1 At+1 , where next period’s productivity is given by At+1
= J At with J > 1 if entrepreneurs have sufficient funds to innovate and At+1 = At otherwise. Firms 
have sufficient funds (profits plus resource revenues Qt) to innovate if they have enough cash 
flow to cope with adverse liquidity shocks, i.e., P (St + St Qt) > zP t At where P is a measure of 
financial development and z is a random liquidity shock. If liquidity shocks z are i.i.d. across 
firms with cumulative density function F(z), the probability of innovation is given by: 












Higher profits or natural resource revenues and a more developed financial system imply that 
more firms are able to overcome liquidity shocks and thus that the probability of innovation is 
higher. Profit maximization yields the following levels of employment and profits: 
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so that higher productivity, a lower expected price level (i.e., a lower wage) and a higher realized 
price level boost profits. The probability of innovation is thus given by: 6
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The rate of economic growth increases with the expected probability of innovation: 
(4) 1 E[ ]
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Aghion, et al (2006) makes the assumption that the cumulative density function F(.) is concave, 
so that E[F(c)] d F(E[c]). The cumulative density functions of standard deviations of commodity 
prices given in Figure 3 are indeed concave (and close to the normal cumulative density 
functions). It follows that more exchange rate volatility stunts innovations and curbs growth, 
especially if the degree of financial development is weak. Moving from a peg to a float thus leads 
to a lower rate of economic growth. Here we are more interested in the effect of commodity 
prices on growth performance: A high and stable level of resource revenues eases liquidity 
constraints and thus boosts innovations and economic growth. However, for a given expected 
level of natural resource revenues, more volatility in commodity prices and resource revenues 
harms innovation and growth, especially if financial development is weak. 
IMF data on 44 commodities and national commodity export shares and monthly indices 
on national commodity export prices for 58 countries during 1980-2002 indicate that real 
commodity prices affect real exchange rate volatility (Cashin, et al, 2002). Since we have seen 
that real exchange rate uncertainty exacerbates the negative effects of domestic credit market 
constraints, this gives another reason why volatility of commodity prices curbs economic growth. 
Also, many resource-rich countries suffer from poorly developed financial systems and financial 
remoteness and thus suffer from bigger macroeconomic volatility (Aghion, et al, 2006; Rose and 
Spiegel, 2007). Given the high volatility of primary commodity prices and resource revenues and 
thus of the real exchange rate of many resource-rich countries, we expect resource-rich countries 
with poorly developed financial systems to have poor growth performance. 
With complete financial markets, long-term investment is counter-cyclical and mitigates 
volatility. However, if firms face tight credit constraints, investment is pro-cyclical and amplifies 
volatility. Of course, there may be other reasons why volatility may depress economic growth 
(Aghion, et al, 2005). Learning by doing and human capital accumulation is increasing and 7
concave in the cyclical component of production (Martin and Rogers, 2000). In that case, long-
run growth should be negatively related to the amplitude of the business cycle.
3 This explanation 
does not require uncertainty and holds for predictable shocks as well. With irreversible 
investment, increased volatility holds back investment and thus depresses growth (Bernanke, 
1983; Pindyck, 1991; Aizenman and Marion, 1991). The costs of volatility come from firms 
making uncertainty-induced planning errors (Ramey and Ramey, 1991). These costs arise if it is 
costly to switch factors of production between sectors (Bertola, 1994; Dixit and Rob, 1994). 
However, if firms choose to use technologies with a higher variance and a higher expected return 
(Black, 1987) or if higher volatility induces more precautionary saving and thus more investment 
(Mirman, 1971), there may be a positive link between volatility and growth. If the activity that 
generates productivity growth is a substitute to production, the opportunity cost of productivity 
enhancing activities is lower in recessions and thus volatility may boost growth (Aghion and 
Saint Paul, 1998). Ultimately, the question of whether anticipated or unanticipated volatility 
harms or boosts growth thus needs to be settled empirically.  
In economies where only debt contracts are available and bankruptcy is costly, the real 
exchange rate becomes much more volatile if there is specialization in traded goods and services 
and the non-resource traded sector is small (Hausmann and Ribogon, 2002).  Shocks to the 
demand for non-traded goods and services – associated with shocks to natural resource income – 
are then not accommodated by movements in the allocation of labour but by expenditure 
switching. This demands much higher relative price movements. Due to bankruptcy costs, interest 
rates increase with relative price volatility. This causes the economy to specialize away from non-
resource traded goods and services, which is inefficient. The less it produces of these goods and 
services, the more volatile the economy becomes and the higher the interest rate has to be. This 
causes the sector to shrink further until it vanishes. Others stress that resource revenues are used 
as collateral and encourage countries to engage in ‘excessive’ borrowing at the expense of future 
generations, which can harm the economy both in short and long run (Mansoorian, 1991). 
Volatility is bad for growth, investment, income distribution, poverty and educational 
attainment (e.g., Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aizenman and Marion, 1999; Flug et al, 1999). To get 
round such natural resource curses, the government could resort to stabilization and saving 
policies and improve the efficiency of financial markets. It also helps to have a fully diversified 
economy, since then shocks to non-traded demand can be accommodated through changes in the 
structure of production rather than expenditure switching. This is relevant for inefficiently 
3 They find that for industrialized countries and European regions a higher standard deviation of growth 
and of unemployment tends to depress growth rates. 8
specialized countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela, but less so for diversified countries like 
Mexico or Indonesia or naturally specialized countries such as some Gulf States. Unfortunately, 
resource-rich economies are often specialized in production and thus tend to be more volatile. 
2.2. Political arguments 
Natural resource bonanzas reduce critical faculties of politicians and induce a false sense of 
security. This can lead to investment in ‘white elephant’ projects, bad policies (e.g., import 
substitution or unsustainable budgetary policies), and favours to political clientele, which cannot 
be financed once resource revenues dry up. Politicians loose sight of growth-promoting policies, 
free trade and ‘value for money’ management. During commodity booms countries often engage 
in exuberant public spending as if resource revenues last forever. This carries the danger of 
unsustainable spending programmes, which need to be reversed when global commodity prices 
collapse and revenues dry up. Encouraged by the Prebisch hypothesis (i.e., the secular decline of 
world prices of primary exports), many developing countries have made the mistake of trying in 
vain to promote state-led industrialization through prolonged import substitution using tariffs, 
import quota and subsidies for manufacturing in an attempt to avoid resource dependency. These 
policies may have been a reaction to the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the decline of 
the traded manufacturing sectors caused by natural resource dependence. The natural resource 
wealth may thus have prolonged bad policies, which eventually had to be reversed. The resulting 
policy-induced volatility harms growth and welfare. Table 1 indicates that resource-rich countries 
indeed have a relatively high volatility in the national income share of government. 
Political scientists have also argued that states adopt and maintain sub-optimal policies 
(Ross, 1999). Cognitive theories blame policy failures on short-sightedness of state actors, who 
ignore the adverse effects of their actions on the generations that come after the natural resource 
is exhausted, thus leading to myopic sloth and exuberance. These cognitive theories highlight a 
get-quick-rich mentality among businessmen, a boom-and-bust psychology among policy makers, 
and abuse of resource wealth by privileged classes, sectors, client networks and interest groups. 
3. Estimation Methodology 
3.1. Cross-country estimation 
Consider a dataset with N countries and a sample period of T years. Ramey and Ramey (1995) 
specify the following econometric model for growth in GDP per capita: 
(5)      
70 log( ) , it i i it y OV H '    X ș
2 (0, ), 1,..., , 1,.., , it i Ni N t T HV     9
where yit is GDP per capita in country i for year t, Vi is the standard deviation for country i of the 
residuals Hit, Xi70 is a vector of control variables for country i and year 1970, and T is a vector of 
coefficients assumed to be constant across countries. The residuals Hit are the deviations of growth 
from the predicted values based on the controls. The variances of these residuals do not depend 
on time, but do vary for each country. The standard controls included in Xi70 are initial log of 
GDP per capita, average share of investment in GDP, initial human capital (proxied by average 
years of schooling for those older than 25 years in 1970 taken from Barro and Lee (1993)) and 
average annual rate of population growth over the sample period. Ramey and Ramey (1995) then 
find statistically significant estimates for O of -0.211 for a sample of 92 countries and -0.385 for 
the OECD countries. There is thus a negative relationship between volatility and conditional 
growth performance. In terms of the magnitude of the economic impact, volatility ranks third 
after the investment share and initial income per capita in the sample of 92 countries and second 
after initial income per capita for the OECD sample. We will also test whether natural resource 
dependence, openness and financial development exert additional effects on growth. 
We also probe into the black box of (5) and try to explain volatility (i.e., the standard 
deviation of the yearly error in the growth equation) in terms of degree of financial development, 
resource dependence, the distance from navigable river or coast. We collect these variables 
affecting volatility in the vector Zi70 and estimate the cross-country regressions: 
(6) 70 70 log( ) , it i i i it y OV H '     X ș Z ȕ
2
70 exp( ) ii c V    Z Ȗ   and 
2 (0, ), 1,.., , 1,.., . it i Ni N t T HV     
Average volatility ıi is assumed constant over time, but different for each country depending on 
the initial country characteristics captured in Zi70. If countries are similar in terms of the Zi70, they 
are also predicted to have similar volatility. The vector of parameters Ȗ measures the average 
across-country effect of factors like resource dependence, financial development and distance 
from waterways on volatility. We also allow for direct effects of these variables on growth (ȕ).
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where the covariance matrix is defined by 
2
70 exp( ), 1,.., , 1,.., , ii ci N t T V         t,ii Ȉ Z Ȗ  and 
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The method of econometric estimation is analogous to that of an autoregressive conditional-
heteroskedasticity in mean (ARCH-M) estimation (Engle, Lilien, Robins, 1987). The variances 
are conditional, but time invariant. The error terms are uncorrelated across countries.
4
3.2. Panel estimation 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) argue that government spending affects volatility of output across time 
and countries. They first estimate country-specific forecasting equations for growth in 
government spending that include a constant, two lags of the log of GDP per capita, two lags of 
the log of government spending per capita, a quadratic time trend, a post-1973 trend, and a 
dummy for the post-1973 period. They then use ML to estimate the following equations linking 
squared innovations to government spending and output-innovation volatility to growth: 
(8) 'log(yit) = OV it + T Xit + Hit, Hit a N(0, Vi
2), Vit = D0 + D1 Pit
2, i = 1,..,I, t = 1,..,T,
where Pit
2 is the square of the estimated residual for country i in year t from the forecasting 
equations for government spending. Regression (8) contains also time and country fixed effects. 
Government spending is effectively used to obtain a statistical estimate of volatility that varies 
both over time and across countries. The estimate for O is similar for the sample of 92 countries 
(namely,  0.178), but the estimate for the OECD sample is much higher (i.e.,  0.949). Countries 
with higher innovation variances thus have lower mean conditional growth rates. 
In our empirical work, we allow natural resource dependence to be included in Zit as an 
explanatory variable of economic growth and as a determinant of volatility. We thus estimate: 
(9) log( ) , it it it it it y OV H '     X ș Z ȕ
2 exp( ) it it t c V   Z Ȗ   and 
2 (0, ), 1,.., , 1,.., . it it Ni N t T HV     
Zit now includes time-varying data on financial development, resource dependence, etc, which 
also allows volatility to vary over time. The panel should give us a more efficient estimate and 
4 Allowing for non-zero covariances as in Cermeño and Grier (2005) would increase the number of 
parameters to be estimated too much to be identified for the large country panel we work with. 11
allows us to control for unobserved fixed effects. The initial year will no longer be 1970, but 
changes every five years. As various countries become open with time, this allows us to address 
the question whether countries as a consequence become less volatile. In contrast, the cross-
section estimate address the related question whether countries which were open in 1970 were 
less volatile. Furthermore, we can factor out the effect of unobserved fixed effects on growth. To 
do this, we apply the within-transformation (subtracting the mean of each variable over time per 
country from itself) on all variables and re-estimate the panel with ML. Since the mean of a fixed 
effect is itself, the fixed effects cancel out. The coefficients can then be interpreted as the effect of 
a change in the variable relative to its country-mean over time.  
4. Cross-Country Evidence 
The stylized facts discussed in the introduction suggest that natural resources play a key role in 
understanding macroeconomic volatility and growth prospects. Once account is taken of the 
negative effect of cross-country variations in volatility on the rate of economic growth, the level 
of resource dependence may exert a positive effect on growth.
5 From a policy perspective, it is 
important to know whether any adverse negative indirect effect of natural resources on growth 
performance via volatility of unanticipated output growth dominates any adverse positive direct
effect of resource dependence on growth and whether the adverse effects are weakened if there 
are well developed financial institutions. Furthermore, we test whether landlocked countries 
experience higher volatility and lower growth. To get meaningful results, we control for initial 
income per capita, population growth, investment rates and primary schooling on growth. 
4.1. Explaining volatility by country and regional dummies 
Table 2 provides cross-country empirical evidence on how much volatility of unanticipated 
output per capita growth depresses average annual growth in GDP per capita. The appendix gives 
the definition of all the variables and their source of origin. The positive coefficients on the 
average investment share and initial human capital suggest countries that invest a lot in physical 
and human capital enjoy a higher growth rate in income per capita, albeit that the coefficient on 
human capital is not very significant. Similarly, countries with very high population growth rates 
tend to have worse growth performance. And, of course, the significant negative coefficient on 
5 In fact, if the explanatory variable is natural resource abundance (proxied by natural resource wealth) 
rather than natural resource dependence, there appears to be a positive effect on growth performance (e.g., 
Ding and Field, 2005; Alexeev and Conrad, 2005; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2007). From our point of 
view, this does not seem surprising as natural resource wealth is much less volatile than natural resource 
export revenues and more likely to boost the rate of economic growth. 12
initial GDP per capita indicates that poor countries which start off with a low level of income per 
capita catch up and grow faster ceteris paribus (i.e., conditional convergence). Regression 1 is our 
benchmark regression, which indicates that volatility of unanticipated output growth negatively 
affects growth in GDP per capita. This confirms for our sample the results of Ramey and Ramey 
(1995). However, regression 2 indicates that there is some evidence for serial correlation in the 
errors. Regression 3 tests whether there is any evidence for a natural resource curse along the 
lines of Sachs and Warner (1995). We only find support for a negative coefficient for point-
source natural resource dependence on economic growth.
6 In contrast to much of the existing 
empirical literature, financial development, openness to international trade
7 and various 
interactions terms are insignificant explanatory factors of cross-country variations in growth in 
GDP per capita. One possible explanation of this is that the effects of these variables are picked 
up by the effect of volatility on growth performance. We return to that in section 4.2. 
In order to get an initial understanding of the sources and origins of volatility, regression 
4 explains volatility by regional block dummies instead of country dummies. Interesting is that 
Sub-Saharan African and to a lesser extent the Middle-East and North Africa are much more 
volatile and thus suffer much more from bad growth prospects. If Sub-Saharan Africa would have 
the same volatility as East Asia and the Pacific, its average annual growth rate would be a half 
percentage point higher. Regression 4 also indicates that, controlling for all traditional factors 
explaining cross-country differences in growth performance, there is no evidence of a traditional 
resource curse as the share of point-source or diffuse natural resource exports in total exports is 
insignificant.
8 However, regression 5 does indicate that point-source natural resource rents (i.e., 
net of exploration costs)
9 exert a negative effect on growth in GDP per capita even after allowing 
for the effects of volatility on growth. Regression 5 also shows significant interaction terms with 
openness and financial development at the 1%-level. This suggests that the resource curse is less 
pronounced for countries open to international trade and with well functioning financial systems. 
For very open countries with a high degree of financial development, the resource curse can even 
be turned into a blessing. 
Clearly, the regional block dummies leave out information that is in the country 
dummies. The resulting omitted variable bias is why the coefficient on volatility is bigger, since it 
forces countries within each region to have similar volatility. 
6 These include oil, gas, ores and minerals, which are typically produced in concentrated locations. 
7 We use the openness variable of Sachs and Warner (1997) as expanded by Wacziarg ad Welch (2003). 
8 Diffuse natural resources include agricultural raw materials and foods such as livestock, coffee, bananas 
or tobacco, which typically are produced throughout the country. 
9 The resource rents data are not necessarily superior, since extraction costs are available for much fewer 
countries than resource revenues and are often proxied by regional/continental rather than local costs.  13
4.2. Opening the black box: Underlying determinants of volatility and the resource curse 
To better understand the effects of natural resource dependence on growth, we need to dig deeper 
into the determinants of volatility. Regression 6a in Table 3 does exactly that and allows for an 
autoregressive error structure. It still finds that investment in physical and human capital boost 
economic growth while population growth depresses growth in income per capita. There is also 
again evidence for conditional convergence, so that poor countries catch up. Interestingly, there is 
now evidence of a significant positive direct effect of point-source natural resources on economic 
growth. There is no evidence for a significant effect of openness on growth. There is evidence for 
a significant direct effect of financial development on economic growth, but unfortunately it is 
negative. More important, volatility of unanticipated growth exerts a powerful and negative effect 
on growth in GDP per head. As expected, volatility itself increases with the GDP share of point-
source resources and to a lesser extent with the GDP share of diffuse resources. Volatility also 
decreases with the degree of financial development and openness of a country to international 
trade, which supports the hypothesis put forward by Aghion et al (2006) and Rose and Spiegel 
(2007). In line with Malik and Temple (2006), we find that volatility increases with the distance 
from navigable coast or rivers, which is their strongest predictor of output volatility. 
  Figure 5 calculates on the basis of regression 6a the marginal effect of resource 
dependence on growth. This effect depends on the volatility of unanticipated output growth, 
because the standard deviation of unanticipated output growth impacts the mean equation while 
the variance equation explains the logarithm of the variance of unanticipated output growth.
10
Natural resource dependence is thus a curse for very volatile countries, but a boon for countries 
with relatively stable unanticipated output growth. In fact, if V exceeds 0.064 (i.e., 
2*0.063/(1.581*1.247), resource dependence curbs growth and otherwise it boosts growth. We 
see from Figure 5 that for the less volatile OECD (including Norway) and Asian Tigers, resource 
dependence is a boon for growth, while for volatile landlocked Africa (especially Zambia) a 
curse. For resource-rich Africa the positive direct effect of resource dependence is more or less 
cancelled out by the indirect effect through volatility. In later regressions we find a negative
direct effect of resource dependence on growth, in which case the line in Figure 5 lies below the 
horizontal axis. The resource curse is then more severe for more volatile countries. 
10 Ramey and Ramey (1995) have used the same specification. We also tried the logarithm of the variance 
in the mean equation, but this gave a much worse fit. 14
4.3. Dealing with the endogenous nature of investment shares 
Growing countries attract more investment, which may reverse the direction of causality. Even 
though we control for openness and financial development, we may not capture enough of the 
institutional effects on growth and investment. We therefore look for an exogenous variable that 
strongly predicts the investment share, but does not affect growth or correlate with other 
important unobserved characteristics. We instrument the investment share with an index of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization. This index measures the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group (Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2005a).
11 The rationale is that trust, ability to communicate and social cohesion are 
essential prerequisites for successful investment. Fractionalized countries have lower levels of 
trust, more corruption, less transfers, subsidies and political rights (Alesina et al, 2003). These 
factors should lower the investment rate, since they increase uncertainty about returns and 
expropriation.
12 We also assume that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is randomly ‘assigned’ to 
countries and mostly historically determined. Countries should also not have systematically 
different growth rates depending on their degree of ethnic fractionalization. We suspect that this 
is the case given the very different growth experiences of countries among the top-ten of ethnic 
fractionalization, i.e., Canada, Senegal, India and Mali. Among the least fractionalized 10 
countries are Norway, Japan, Tunisia, and Greece. We also include two geographical variables: 
whether a country is landlocked or not, and a climate variable. Investment opportunities may be 
lower if it is more difficult for a country to diversify and export. Alesina et al (2003) also find 
strong correlations between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and geographical variables. This 
allows us to isolate the effect of fractionalization on investment and moreover to conduct a 
Sargan over-identification test for exogeneity of the instruments.  
Regressions 6b and 6c of Table 3 report the first and second stage of this IV regression 
and confirm the detrimental effect of volatility on growth. Although the positive effect of 
investment shares on growth are now bigger, the qualitative results are similar to the ML 
estimates presented in regression 6a. The first stage confirms that ethno-linguistic 
11 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) base their data on the World Christian Encyclopedia. They argue 
that fractionalization is a poor predictor of civil war compared to ethnic polarization. We are therefore more 
confident that there is no effect of fractionalization on growth via the link of conflicts.  
12 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b) argue that ethnic polarization affects investment but not growth, 
while fractionalization affects growth directly as in Easterly and Levine (1997), but not investment. 
However, these growth regressions do not control for population growth or volatility. If we run regression 
6a with ethnic fractionalization and polarization using their ethnicity data, we find no growth effects of 
these two variables. Adding polarization to the first stage yields no effect of polarization, but still gives a 
significant negative effect of fractionalization on investment. Taking the effect of volatility into account 
seems to have important effects on the link between ethnicity and growth, and should be seen as 
complementary. Regressions available on request. We return to this issue in section 4.5. 15
fractionalization has a strong effect on the investment share. The degree to which a country is 
landlocked also affects the investment share, but only if we do not cluster standard errors by 
country (which allows for autocorrelation within countries). The F-test on the excluded 
instruments is much larger than 10, which means that our specification does not suffer from weak 
instrument bias (Stock and Yogo, 2002). This also greatly lowers any bias from a direct 
correlation with growth. The Sargan tests are also passed with confidence and imply that our 
instruments are exogenous. The first stage of the IV regressions show a significant positive 
correlation with natural resource dependence and the investment share. We cannot claim that this 
is causal, but it further explains the positive effect of resource dependence on growth after 
controlling for volatility.  
4.4. Natural resource rents, volatility and growth 
Our estimates quantify the effects of the GDP share of natural resource exports on volatility and 
growth, but it seems relevant to also take account of production costs of extracting natural 
resources. Regressions 7 therefore present the corresponding ML and IV estimates with the GDP 
share of natural resource rents as an explanatory variable. Again, growth performance is 
negatively affected by volatility of unanticipated output growth even after allowing for the 
positive effect of investment shares and the negative effect of population growth and initial 
income per capita on growth performance. Financial development and openness now have a 
negative direct effect on growth, but the interaction terms with natural resource rents are 
significant and positive. For the lowest degree of financial development, the net effect of the GDP 
share of resource rents on growth is negative (i.e., 0.143 for the IV estimates) for countries 
closed to international trade, but positive (i.e., +0.090) for countries open to international trade. If 
countries have higher degrees of financial development, the marginal effect of resource rents on 
growth may be positive even for closed economies.  
The GDP share of point-source resource rents and the distance from the navigable coast 
or rivers have a significant positive effect on volatility and thus a negative effect on growth. In 
contrast, regression 7 shows a significant negative effect of openness and financial development 
on volatility of unanticipated output growth and thus a positive effect on growth. Regression 8 
drops diffuse resources in the variance equation and obtains similar results as regression 7a. 
Figure 6 is based on regression 8 and shows that for already moderate degrees of financial 
development the marginal effect of the rent share on growth in the mean equation is positive 
rather than negative. Resource dependence has a positive effect on growth in open economies and  
a negative effect for closed economies. Hence, countries that are open to international trade and 16
have a high degree of financial development turn the resource curse into a blessing. Regression 
6d in Table 4 adds an interaction term between financial development and point-source resource 
dependence. As expected, the volatility effect of natural resource dependence is less pronounced 
if a country is more financially developed, although this interaction term is not well determined. 
Probing deeper into the determinants of volatility, we thus find that countries that are 
closed to international trade, have badly functioning financial markets, are landlocked and have a 
high share of natural resource rents have higher volatility in unanticipated growth in output per 
capita and therefore worse growth prospects. These results suggest, in contrast to the previous 
literature, that volatility of commodity prices is a key feature of the resource curse. 
4.5. Resource Share Volatility, Ethnic Tensions and Economic Restrictions 
With regression 6a as the benchmark, the second half of Table 4 gives ML estimates of 
regressions with volatility of GDP shares of resource exports as an additional explanatory 
variable in the variance equation. Regression 9a indicates that adding the volatility of the GDP 
share of both point-source and diffuse resources to the variance equation significantly helps to 
explain the volatility of unanticipated output growth. Regression 9b indicates that, inspired by 
Fatás and Mihov (2005), adding the volatility of the GDP share of government spending also 
significantly improves our estimate of the volatility of unanticipated growth. Furthermore, 
regression 9c shows that especially the volatility of food export share, the volatility of fuel export 
share and the volatility of ores & metals export share contribute to the volatility of unanticipated 
output growth. The volatility effect of natural resources is not limited to oil-producing countries, 
but also includes for example copper, coffee, banana and tobacco exporters. The qualitative 
results of the estimated mean equation are not much affected, except that the estimated negative 
effect of volatility on growth is almost three times smaller and quite close to the black-box 
estimate with individual country dummies (despite being much more parsimonious). Although we 
did not find evidence for a significant interaction term between financial development and initial
point-source resource dependence in the variance equation, we find in regression 9d that well-
functioning capital markets greatly reduce the effect that changes in the resource share have on 
volatility. Consistent with the model of section 2, a stable share of resources in GDP does not 
increase volatility by itself, rather rapid fluctuations in the share through prices create liquidity 
constraints and harm growth. Financial development gives a country the means to deal with 
sudden changes in resource revenues.  
Table 5 presents some further robustness tests of our results. Since ethnic polarization as 
defined by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b) is a good predictor of civil conflict, it may also 17
be a good predictor of volatility. We want to check whether resources still have an independent 
effect on volatility when we allow for an effect of ethnic polarization. Regression 10a indicates 
indeed that ethnic polarization significantly improves the estimate of the volatility of 
unanticipated output growth, but regression 10b shows that this is no longer the case once the 
volatility of the export shares of point-source and diffuse resources and the volatility of the GDP 
share of government spending are used as explanatory variables of volatility. This is not so 
surprising, since ethnic polarization may be an exogenous proxy for the somewhat endogenous 
volatilities of resource export and government spending shares. 
Table 5 also tests for the impact of economic restrictions to examine whether financial 
liberalization boosts or depresses growth. Regression 11a indicates that capital account 
restrictions have a significant negative direct impact on growth. However, this is swamped by the 
negative effect of capital account restrictions on volatility and thus the positive effect on growth, 
especially for countries with a high degree of natural resource dependence. Capital account 
restrictions may thus help to curb volatility and increase growth performance, especially in 
resource-rich countries.
13 Access to international capital markets may have a pro-cyclical 
element, which tends to generate higher output volatility especially in resource-rich, developing 
economies. Current account restrictions have no significant direct effect on growth, but do 
contribute to volatility especially in resource-rich countries and thus hamper growth. Regression 
11a also indicates that surrender of export receipts are associated with higher volatility and lower 
growth. Multiple exchange practices lower volatility and increase growth, since they are a form of 
exchange control and curb volatile capital in- and outflows. Regression 11b drops the interaction 
terms and indicates that, as before, the volatility of the GDP shares of point-source and diffuse 
natural resource exports and the volatility of the GDP share of government spending boost 
volatility of unanticipated output growth and thus depress growth in GDP per capita.  
5. Panel Evidence 
Table 6 reports our panel estimates of the effects of volatility, natural resource dependence, 
financial development and openness as well as investment rates, schooling, population growth 
and initial income per capita on growth in GDP per capita. Regressions 12 report the estimates 
where the independent variables are five-yearly means while regression 13 and 14 report results 
where independent variables are five-yearly initial values. The growth rate varies every year and 
the unanticipated yearly shocks to growth are used to calculate the volatility. All regressions 
13 Kose et al (2003) find that increased gross financial flows and absence of capital account restrictions lead 
to an increase in the relative volatility of consumption. 18
indicate that investment rates have a significant positive effect on growth and that population 
growth and initial income per capita have a significant negative effect on growth in GDP per 
capita. Human capital only has a significant positive effect on growth in regressions 12a, 13a and 
14a, which is not so surprising as human capital does not change much and its effects are picked 
up by the fixed effects in regressions 12b, 13b and 14b. Regressions 12a and 13a also show a 
significant negative effect of volatility of unanticipated output growth on growth performance, 
but the fixed effects regressions 12b and 13b do not. If volatility in a country has increased over 
time relative to the average volatility, this has not affected growth significantly. Apparently, there 
is not enough time variation in volatility to distinguish it from country fixed effects.
14 In the mean 
regressions openness and natural resources do not significantly impact growth. Since they do not 
change much, they may be picked up by the fixed effects. The variance equations of regressions 
12a and 13a indicate that volatility increases with point-base resource dependence and to a lesser 
extent with diffuse resource dependence. Through this channel resource dependence has a 
negative impact on growth. We also confirm that a high degree of financial development, 
openness and distance to navigable coast or rivers lead to less volatility and thus to more growth. 
Given increased globalization and financial integration, it is interesting to examine 
whether the adverse effect of volatility on growth has diminished in recent years (cf., Kose et al, 
2006). Regressions 14a and b therefore repeat regression 13a and b for the years 1990-2003. We 
find a negative but less significant adverse effect of volatility on growth within this sub-sample. 
However, after controlling for fixed effects in regression 14b, we find that this effect turns 
positive, albeit that it is not very significant. We conclude that after 1990 the significant effect of 
volatility on growth has disappeared. Despite the short time span, we find the usual effects of 
resource dependence and financial development. 
6. Accounting for Growth Performance: Africa versus the Asian Tigers
To get a feeling for what our estimates of the determinants of growth in GDP per capita imply in 
practice, it is interesting to perform some counterfactual exercises. We perform these exercises 
based on our preferred equation 6a of Table 3. It is insightful to compare the African countries 
with the Asian Tigers, since they have similar starting positions. We therefore compare in Table 7 
resource-rich and landlocked Africa with the Asian Tigers. Resource-rich countries are those in 
the global top 25 and natural resource exports valuing more than 17.31% of GDP during 1970-
2003. Since the resource-rich countries of Africa were poorer in 1970 than the Asian Tigers, they 
14 However, using a rolling windows methodology, there is some evidence that the effect of volatility of 
annual output growth on growth in GDP per capita varies over time (Edwards, 2007). 19
grow faster and catch up. We see from the top panel of Table 7 that this growth differential 
amounts to 1.12%-point per year. Allowing for the positive direct growth effects of higher natural 
resource dependence in Africa, we see that the growth differential with the Tigers becomes 
1.67%-point. Now if those African countries would invest as much in physical and human capital 
as the Asian Tigers, they would add a further 0.59%- and 0.58%-points, respectively to their 
annual growth rate. If resource-rich Africa’s population growth rate were to be reduced in line 
with the Tigers, Africa would gain yet another 0.56%-point annual growth. These three factors 
combined yield an extra bonus to potential growth of 1.73%-point. However, the key message is 
how much potential growth is lost due to the high volatility of unanticipated output growth in 
resource-rich Africa compared with the Asian Tigers: a whopping 3.23%-point extra growth per 
annum! The main reasons for the high volatility of these resource-rich countries in Africa 
compared with the Asian Tigers are their heavy dependence on natural resources (0.48%-point), 
their lack of openness (1.70%-point), their badly developed financial markets (0.58%-point) and 
their distance from navigable waterways (1.09%-point). Annual growth could thus in total be 
raised by as much as 4.96%-point. The growth differential with the Tigers could thus have been 
boosted from 1.67%- to 6.63%-points per year, which is a huge amount. 
The bottom panel of Table 7 compares landlocked Africa with the Tigers. The results are 
similar, although the prospects of these countries are perhaps even more miserable. Still, as 
landlocked Africa starts off from a worse starting position than resource-rich Africa, it catches up 
more quickly and thus grows 1.82%-point faster than the Tigers. Accounting for landlocked 
Africa being more dependent on resources than the Tigers, would raise this growth differential to 
2.24%-point. Now bringing mainly investment in physical and human capital but also population 
growth in line with the Tigers would add an extra 1.94%-point growth per annum. This offers 
some hope. However, if landlocked Africa were to be able to bring down its volatility of 
unanticipated output in line with that of the Tigers, it would boost growth by a further 4.30%-
point per annum. The potential growth bonus is thus 6.24%-point. If this were feasible, 
landlocked Africa’s growth differential with the Tigers could have been boosted from 2.24%- to 
8.48%-points per annum. The countries Malawi and Zambia are resource rich and landlocked.
They also have relatively high volatility and poorly developed financial systems. Not 
surprisingly, they can boost their annual growth differential with the Tigers from, respectively, 
3.12%- and 4.46%-points to 7.94%- and 12.88%-points. 
We conclude that the big push to economic growth occurs if the volatility of 
unanticipated output growth in Africa is brought down to the level of the Asian Tigers. The big 
contributing factors to Africa’s volatility are its volatile stream of mainly point-source natural 20
resource revenues, its lack of fully developed financial markets and openness to international 
trade, and its disadvantages of being relatively more landlocked than the Asian Tigers.  
7. Concluding Remarks  
We have shown that the curse of natural resources is foremost a problem of volatility. The high 
volatility of world prices of natural resources causes severe volatility of output per capita growth 
in countries that depend heavily on them. The resulting volatility of unanticipated output growth 
has a robust negative effect on long-run growth itself and can therefore rightly be coined a curse. 
This is not limited to oil-producing countries, but also applies to exporters of copper, coffee, 
foods, etc. which include many of the world’s worst performing countries. Also, ethnic tensions, 
which are often literally fuelled by resource wealth, and current account restrictions increase 
volatility. The latter effect is especially strong in resource-rich countries. Government spending 
bonanzas after windfall resource revenues also increase volatility to the detriment of growth, 
because revenue drops inevitably follow. 
Volatility can fortunately be substantially reduced provided that countries have a sound 
financial system to cope with large and sudden fluctuations in resource income. Fewer capital 
account restrictions, openness and physical access to world trade also lower volatility. Countries 
can turn the curse even into a blessing, because we find evidence for a positive direct effect of 
natural resource dependence on growth after controlling for volatility. The key to a turn-around 
for many resource-rich countries is financial development, ensuring openness and mitigating the 
effect of being landlocked, because the indirect negative effect of resource dependence on 
growth, via volatility, is much larger than any direct positive effect. While it may be difficult to 
lower price volatility of resources themselves, it should be feasible to deal with volatility in a 
more efficient way. Future research should focus on ways to overcome the political temptations 
of short-run resource wealth to create the financial and political institutions needed to reduce 
volatility, soften the impact of volatility on growth and prevent poverty.  
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Data Appendix 
VARIABLE NAME D EFINITION S OURCE
GDP/capita growth rate  Ln difference in real GDP per capita, Laspeyres  PWT 6.2 from Heston et al 
(2006)
Average investment 
share of GDP 




Ln difference in total population  PWT 6.2 from Heston et al 
(2006)
log per capita GDP  Ln real GDP per capita  PWT 6.2 from Heston et al 
(2006)
Human capital  Average schooling years in the total population  Barro & Lee (2000) 
Point-source resources  F.o.b. value of exported fuels + ores & metals as a percentage of GDP   WDI (2006) 
Diffuse resources  F.o.b. value of exported foods and agricultural raw materials as a 
percentage of GDP  
WDI (2006) 
Fuels  F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Corresponds to SITC 
section 3 (mineral fuels). 
WDI (2006) 
Ores & Metals  F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Commodities in SITC 




F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Corresponds to SITC 
section: 2 (crude materials except fuels) excluding divisions 22, 27 (crude 
fertilizers and minerals excluding coal, petroleum, and precious stones), 
and 28 (metalliferous ores and scrap). 
WDI (2006) 
Foods  F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Commodities in SITC 
sections: 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), and 4 
(animal and vegetable oils and fats) and SITC division 22 (oil seeds, oil 
nuts, and oil kernels). 
WDI (2006) 
Resource rents  (total sale value – total production costs)/GDP, current US$ 
for bauxite, copper, nickel, tin, zinc, lead, phosphates, iron ore, silver, 
gold (ores); brown coal, hard coal, oil, natural gas (fuels) 




Monthly averages of free-market price indices for all food, agricultural 
raw materials, minerals, ores & metals, crude petroleum (average of 
Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted). Base year 2000 = 100. 
UNCTAD, 2007 
Financial development  Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  WDI (2006) 
Sachs Warner updated 
openness dummy 
open to trade = 1  Wacziarg & Welch (2003)
Landlocked dummy  =1 if a country has no access to sea  Gallup et al (1999) 
% population in 
temperate climate zone 
% 1995 pop in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones (Cf+Cs+Df+DW)  CID, General Measures of 
Geography, 2007 
Distance to nearest 
navigable river or coast 
minimum distance in km, fixed effect  CID, General Measures of 
Geography, 2007 




Ethnic Fractionalization  Index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (0 to 1), the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong 





yes = 1  IMF (2006) 
Current Account 
Restrictions
yes = 1  IMF (2006) 
Capital Account 
Restrictions
yes = 1  IMF (2006) 
Surrender of Export 
receipts 
yes = 1  IMF (2006) i
Table 1: Growth, Volatility, Financial Development and Resources in World 
Regional Characteristics (%, 1970-2003, at least 10 observations per country)
Export Value Share of GDP  Rent Share 
of GDP
Region
Yearly real GDP 













 mean  sd  mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd  sd  mean
Middle East & North Africa (MENA)  1.18  8.12  22.24 9.30 2.51 1.52 24.75 9.07 26.98 11.20 5.82  41.41
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  0.47  6.52  9.60 3.97 10.24 3.60 19.65 5.66 5.79 3.76 4.76  17.44
East Asia & Pacific (EAP)  2.47  5.00 6.81 3.45 10.04 3.11 16.71 5.49 4.44 2.44 2.72  51.77
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)  1.47 4.54  4.99 2.64 9.66 3.70 14.59 5.34 6.31 3.26 3.98  34.87
South Asia (SA)  2.41  4.41  0.52 0.42 4.25 1.55 4.77 1.83 1.31 0.96 2.98  17.33
Eastern Europe & Central Asia (ECA) 2.56  4.34  2.07 0.66 3.50 1.03 5.57 1.54 2.23 1.23 2.52  22.70
Western Europe (WE)  2.35  2.33  2.71 1.00 5.20 0.95 7.86 1.60 0.55 0.52  1.53  76.08
North America (NA)  2.09  1.90  2.90 0.52 2.99 0.45 5.88 0.85 3.41 1.85  1.60  109.36
1
st q. Av. Fin. Development (<=16.2)  0.70 6.40  9.71 4.23 7.64 3.00 17.06 5.52 5.14 2.95 4.64  10.38
4
th q. Av. Fin. Development (>=52.9)  2.32 4.40  4.68 2.29 5.28 1.78 9.89 3.45 4.99 2.62 3.03  80.92
1
st q. Av. Resource Dep. (<=6.1)  2.73 2.83  1.17 0.48 2.23 0.64 3.41 0.93 1.65 1.11 2.38  64.96
4
th q. Av. Resource Dep. (>=19.3)  1.08 7.37 23.22 10.00 11.62 3.59 34.67 10.85 14.10 6.47 4.72  25.47
1
st q. Distance to waterway (<=49km)  1.76  8.12  6.72 3.41 8.22 2.65 24.75 9.07 6.03 2.50 5.82  41.41
4
th q. Distance to waterway (>=359km)  1.46 6.52  8.22 3.68 8.59 3.43 19.65 5.66 8.99 4.75 4.76  17.44
Note: Means are cross-country averages of country average growth rates or variable shares between 1970 and 2003. Standard deviations (sd) are the 
average cross-country standard deviations of country yearly growth rates or variable shares over the corresponding period. ii
Table 2: Natural Resource Curse and Regional Volatility 















(constant 2000 international dollars, PWT 6.2)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Mean equation  Resource Export Revenues  Resource 
Rents
Average investment share of GDP 1970-2003  0.108*** 0.109*** 0.088*** 0.074*** 0.105*** 
  (0.012) (0.017) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) 
Average population growth rate 1970-2003  -0.472***  -0.464*** -0.571** -0.625***  -0.794*** 
  (0.118) (0.157) (0.222) (0.196) (0.212) 
log per capita GDP 1970  -0.012***  -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.013*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Human capital 1970  0.001*  0.001 0.001*  0.001* -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Volatility (ıi) -0.110**  -0.112*  -0.171*  -0.319**  -0.312** 
  (0.049) (0.066) (0.099) (0.133) (0.133) 
Point-source resources 1970     -0.090**  -0.039   
     (0.040)  (0.038)   
Point-source rent share 1970          -0.236*** 
       (0.082) 
Diffuse resources 1970      0.001  0.014  0.044** 
      (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) 
Financial development 1970      -0.003  -0.000  -0.008 
      (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70      0.001  0.002  0.002 
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Point based resources * openness 70      0.020  0.030   
     (0.090)  (0.065)   
Point-source rent share * openness 70          0.207*** 
       (0.064) 
Point-source resources * Fin. Dev. 70      0.335  0.194   
     (0.219)  (0.186)   
Point-source rent share * Fin. Dev.  70       0.886*** 
       (0.316) 
Constant 0.110***  0.111***  0.136*** 0.153*** 0.134*** 
  (0.011) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) 
1
st Lag Error (İ)    0.272*** 0.273*** 0.248*** 0.220*** 
    (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
2
nd Lag Error (İ)   0.030*  0.002  -0.010  -0.006 
  (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) 
Variance equation
Sub-Saharan Africa       2.579***  2.648*** 
       (0.154)  (0.156) 
Middle-East & North Africa        1.726***  1.701*** 
       (0.161)  (0.164) 
Latin America & Caribbean      1.596***  1.571*** 
       (0.154)  (0.155) 
Eastern Europe & Centra Asia      1.429***  1.372*** 
       (0.272)  (0.271) 
East Asia & Pacific        1.024***  0.865*** 
       (0.160)  (0.160) 
South Asia        0.439**  0.359* 
       (0.195)  (0.197) 
Western Europe        0.212  0.279* 
       (0.155)  (0.154) 
North America       
      
Reference region 
(least volatile) 
Constant -3.823***  -3.961***  -6.629*** -7.803*** -7.763*** 
  (0.118) (0.119) (0.192) (0.150) (0.150) 
Country dummies in variance eq.  yes  yes  yes  no  no 
Observations  3448 3448 2186 2186 2014 
Log likelihood  5898.5  6020.2  4227.3 4017.6 3758.2 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. iii
Table 3: Underlying Determinants of Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse 











































Mean equation Resource Export Revenues  Resource Rents 
Average investment share of GDP ‘70-‘03 0.063**    0.149**  0.118***    0.172**  0.123*** 
 (0.026)    (0.066)  (0.026)    (0.075)  (0.022) 
Average population growth rate 1970-2003  -0.634*** 0.213 -0.609***  -0.887*** -0.299  -0.785*** -0.784*** 
  (0.144) (0.835) (0.145) (0.147) (0.965)  (0.172) (0.141) 
log per capita GDP 1970  -0.018***  -0.027** -0.017***  -0.015***  -0.022  -0.016*** -0.013*** 
  (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015)  (0.003) (0.002) 
Human capital 1970  0.002***  0.013***  0.001  0.000  0.012***  0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Volatility (ıi) -1.247***  -1.170***  -1.078***  -1.328***  -0.351* 
  (0.360)  (0.367) (0.399)  (0.425) (0.184) 
Point-source resources 1970  0.063** 0.242***  0.042   
 (0.025)  (0.039)  (0.029)   
Point-source rent share 1970        -0.223**  0.531**  -0.143 -0.233** 
       (0.108)  (0.233)  (0.107) (0.108) 
Financial development 1970  -0.023***  0.067*  -0.027***  -0.033***  0.066*  -0.038*** -0.022*** 
  (0.007) (0.037) (0.008) (0.008) (0.035)  (0.009) (0.005) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70  -0.009 0.059***  -0.013** -0.011* 0.052**  -0.018** 0.000 
  (0.006) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.022)  (0.008) (0.003) 
Point-source rent share * openness 70      0.243***  -0.028  0.233*** 0.286*** 
 (0.081)  (0.063)  (0.084) (0.106) 
Point-source rent share * Fin. Dev. 70      1.154***  -0.234  0.683** 1.024*** 
 (0.309)  (1.708)  (0.282) (0.319) 
Constant  0.219*** 0.322*** 0.197*** 0.192***  0.293**  0.205*** 0.135*** 
  (0.035) (0.090) (0.041) (0.036) (0.116)  (0.042) (0.025) 
1
st Lag Error (İ) 0.224***    0.224***  0.211***  0.219***  0.186*** 
 (0.017)    (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
2
nd Lag Error (İ) -0.002    -0.004  0.001 
(0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Landlocked dummy    -0.013      -0.008 
   (0.013)      (0.012) 
% Population in Temperate Climate Zone    0.002      0.004 
   (0.026)      (0.032) 
Ethnic Fractionalization Index    -0.074***      -0.061* 
   (0.026)      (0.035) 
Variance equation 
Point based resources 1970  1.581***    1.617***         
  (0.205)    (0.206)      
Point based rent share 1970        2.325***  2.435***  8.096*** 
       (0.651)  (0.635)  (0.247) 
Diffuse resources 1970  0.765**    0.964***  0.165    0.290   
  (0.368)  (0.372)  (0.372)  (0.364)  
Financial development 1970  -1.290***    -1.302***  -1.405***    -1.410***  -1.663*** 
  (0.092)  (0.099)  (0.097)  (0.098)  (0.083) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70  -0.689***    -0.676*** -0.711***    -0.715*** -0.475*** 
  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.043) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001***   0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant -6.097***    -6.115***  -5.980***  -5.969***  -6.171*** 
  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.036) 
Cragg-Donald F-stat. on excl. instruments    134.3 71.4 
Hansen overidentification J-statistic (p-
value) 
0.152 0.376 
Country dummies in variance eq.  no  no  no  no  no 
Observations  2084 2084 2084 1980 1980 1980 2311 
R2   0.72      0.67 
Log likelihood  3729.1    3728.9  3580.6  3572.8  3970.1 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
† Robust and clustered standard errors by country. Landlocked is also significant if standard errors are not clustered.  iv
Table 4: Effects of GDP Shares of Natural Resources on Volatility and Growth 
Dependent Variable   yearly GDP growth 1970-2003  yearly GDP growth 1970-2003 
(constant 2000 international dollars, PWT 6.2)  (6a) (6d) (9a) (9b) (9c) (9d) 
Mean equation        
Average investment share of GDP ‘70-‘03 0.063** 0.062**  0.086*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.088*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Average population growth rate 1970-2003  -0.634*** -0.633*** -0.622***  -0.459** -0.451**  -0.472*** 
  (0.144) (0.143) (0.146) (0.178) (0.179) (0.171) 
log per capita GDP 1970  -0.018***  -0.018***  -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Human capital 1970  0.002***  0.002*** 0.002**  0.001  0.001  0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Volatility (ıi) -1.247***  -1.290***  -0.565**  -0.457**  -0.443**  -0.541*** 
  (0.360) (0.366) (0.233) (0.186) (0.183) (0.187) 
Point based resources 1970  0.063**  0.066*** 0.018  0.009  0.007  0.022 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Financial development 1970  -0.023***  -0.023***  -0.013**  -0.011**  -0.011**  -0.011** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70  -0.009 -0.009 0.000  0.003 0.004 0.002 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant  0.219*** 0.223*** 0.159*** 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.148*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
1
st Lag Error (İ)  0.224*** 0.223*** 0.238*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.236*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
2
nd Lag Error (İ)  -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Variance equation    
Initial point based resources 1970  1.581***  1.986***  -0.499*  -0.796***  -0.569*  -0.647** 
  (0.205) (0.703) (0.287) (0.281) (0.319) (0.295) 
Initial diffuse resources 1970  0.765**  0.774**  -1.023*  -0.261  -1.220**  0.025 
  (0.368) (0.368) (0.548) (0.554) (0.583) (0.555) 
Initial financial development 1970  -1.290***  -1.270***  -1.059***  -0.860***  -0.843***  -0.758*** 
  (0.092) (0.098) (0.099) (0.106) (0.107) (0.114) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 1970  -0.689***  -0.695*** -0.461*** -0.527*** -0.476*** -0.537*** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.055) (0.064) (0.055) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial development * point based share    -2.215         
    (3.387)      
Point based export share volatility 70-03      9.349***  9.572***    15.601*** 
     (0.492)  (0.460)    (1.646) 
Diffuse export share volatility 70-03      11.451***  4.433*    2.463 
     (2.235)  (2.438)    (2.450) 
Government share volatility 70-03        10.830***  10.669***  10.136*** 
      (1.095)  (1.220)  (1.062) 
Agricultural R.M. resource share volatility 70-03          0.799   
       (2.128)   
Foods resource share volatility 70-03          11.650***   
       (3.466)   
Ores & metals resource share volatility 70-03          6.695***   
       (2.240)   
Fuels resource share volatility 70-03          9.555***   
       (0.474)   
Financial development * point based volatility            -32.786*** 
        (8.938) 
Constant  -6.097*** -6.093*** -6.521*** -6.763*** -6.839*** -6.725*** 
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.076) (0.080) (0.085) (0.080) 
        
Observations  2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 
Log  likelihood  3729.1 3729.3 3789.5 3812.6 3813.5 3816.8 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   v
Table 5: Ethnic Tensions, Economic Restrictions and the Resource Curse 
Ethnic tensions  (10a) (10b)  Economic Restrictions  (11a) (11b) 
Mean equation Mean equation
Average investment share of GDP 70-03  0.070**  0.088***  Average investment share of GDP 70-03  0.106***  0.114*** 
 (0.029)  (0.027)    (0.026)  (0.024) 
Average population growth rate 1970-2003  -0.633***  -0.445**  Average population growth rate 1970-2003  -0.719*** -0.671*** 
 (0.212)  (0.215)    (0.192)  (0.226) 
log per capita GDP 1970  -0.018***  -0.014*** log per capita GDP 1970  -0.015***  -0.014*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003) 
Human capital 1970  0.002**  0.001  Human capital 1970  0.002**  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001) 
Volatility (ıi) -0.806***  -0.382*  Volatility  (ıi) -0.514***  -0.294
†
 (0.305)  (0.204)    (0.184)  (0.180) 
Initial point-source resources 70  -0.060  -0.072  Initial point-source resources 70  0.071**  0.035 
 (0.055)  (0.058)    (0.031)  (0.029) 
Financial development 1970  -0.023  -0.011  Initial diffuse resources 70  0.010  0.003 
 (0.032)  (0.028)    (0.030)  (0.027) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70  -0.015**  -0.008  Financial development 1970  -0.014**  -0.008 
 (0.007)  (0.005)    (0.006)  (0.006) 
Initial point-source resources * openness 70  -0.007  -0.001  Current Account Restrictions (yes=1)  0.005 0.004 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Initial point-source resources * Fin. Dev. 70  0.125  0.139  Capital Account restrictions (yes=1)  -0.008** -0.006* 
 (0.098)  (0.087)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Ethnic Polarization  0.355 0.334  Constant  0.156***  0.134*** 
 (0.251)  (0.249)    (0.028)  (0.027) 
Constant 0.193***  0.143***  1
st Lag Error (İ) 0.228***  0.225*** 
 (0.034)  (0.026)    (0.019)  (0.018) 
1
st Lag Error (İ) 0.220***  0.236***  2
nd Lag Error (İ) -0.009   
 (0.017)  (0.017)    (0.020)   
2
nd Lag Error (İ) -0.007  -0.025  Variance equation
(0.020)  (0.021)  Initial point based resources 70  5.656***  0.751* 
     (0.341)  (0.385) 
      Initial diffuse resources 70  1.929***  -0.869 
Variance equation      (0.498)  (0.644) 
Initial point based resources 70  -5.749***  -0.990*** Initial financial development 1970  -1.725***  -0.948*** 
 (1.540)  (0.297)    (0.140)  (0.173) 
Initial diffuse resources 70  0.791*  -0.338  Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001***  0.000*** 
 (0.425)  (0.590)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Initial financial development 1970  -1.128***  -0.832*** Ethnic Polarization    0.416*** 
 (0.111)  (0.114)      (0.124) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70  -0.623***  -0.520*** Multiple Exchange Practices (yes=1)  -0.730*** -0.378*** 
 (0.053)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.065) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001***  0.001***  Current Account Restrictions (yes=1)  0.449*** 0.428*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.070)  (0.069) 
Ethnic Polarization  0.386*** 0.128  Capital Account restrictions (yes=1)  -0.479*** -0.560*** 
 (0.080)  (0.086)  (0.130)  (0.110) 
Point-source resources 70 * Eth. Pol.  9.572***    Surrender of Export receipts (yes=1)  0.359*** 0.511*** 
 (2.051)      (0.116)  (0.105) 
Point-source export share volatility 70-03    9.660***  Cur. Acc. Restrictions * Point Resources 70  4.642***  
   (0.487)    (0.939)   
Diffuse export share volatility 70-03    4.648*  Cap. Acc. Restrictions * Point Resources 70 -1.995***   
   (2.500)    (0.462)   
Government share volatility 70-03    10.430*** Point-source export share volatility 70-03    9.499*** 
   (1.200)      (0.536) 
Constant  -6.393***  -6.820*** Diffuse export share volatility 70-03    13.171*** 
 (0.082)  (0.086)      (2.862) 
      Government share volatility 70-03    6.670*** 
         (1.304) 
     Constant  -6.557***  -7.327*** 
       (0.113)  (0.139) 
Observations 2084  2084 Observations  2015  2015 
Log likelihood  3749.5  3817.3  Log likelihood  3603.9  3679.6 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
† P-value = 0.102 vi
Table 6: Panel-ARCH Estimates of Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse 
Dependent Variable yearly GDP growth 1970-2003  yearly GDP growth 1990-
2003






  independent variables are 
5-yearly means 
independent variables are 
5-yearly initial values 
independent variables are 
5-yearly initial values 
Mean equation       
Investment share of GDP  0.103***  0.113***  0.099*** 0.114*** 0.070*** 0.153*** 
  (0.016) (0.023)  (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.047) 
Population growth rate  -0.562***  -0.352**  -0.733*** -0.317*  -0.498** -0.755** 
  (0.124) (0.167)  (0.124) (0.189) (0.211) (0.318) 
log per capita GDP  -0.014***  -0.017***  -0.019*** -0.038*** -0.012*** -0.108*** 
  (0.002) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) 
Human capital  0.001**  -0.000  0.002*** 0.001  0.002*  0.000 
  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Volatility (ıit) -0.779**  -0.072  -1.162**  -0.051  -1.294  0.235 
  (0.365) (0.365)  (0.494) (0.389) (0.877) (0.575) 
Point-source resource share  0.057 -0.040  0.090 -0.039* 0.097  0.121 
  (0.058) (0.027)  (0.068) (0.023) (0.120) (0.088) 
Diffuse resource share  0.042  0.017  0.055*  -0.044 0.042 -0.027 
  (0.028) (0.040)  (0.030) (0.032) (0.059) (0.058) 
Financial development  -0.011**  -0.005  -0.012**  -0.004  -0.018**  0.001 
  (0.005) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy  -0.003  0.011* -0.008 0.006 -0.016 0.004 
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) 
Point-source resources*Financial development. 0.031  -0.033  0.031 0.003 0.070 -0.040 
  (0.080) (0.049)  (0.081) (0.041) (0.115) (0.105) 
Constant 0.163***  0.010  0.223***  0.002 0.158*** -0.027 
  (0.029) (0.020)  (0.032) (0.021) (0.047) (0.026) 
1
st Lag Error (İ) 0.227***  0.147***  0.238***  0.161***  0.260***  -0.185*** 
  (0.016) (0.015)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.027) (0.032) 
2
nd Lag Error (İ) 0.076***  0.017  0.055***  -0.001  0.034  0.012 
(0.017) (0.018)  (0.019) (0.020) (0.031) (0.024) 
       
Variance equation       
Point-source resource share  4.005*** 0.223  3.716*** -0.159 4.278***  -2.846*** 
  (0.185) (0.213)  (0.169) (0.176) (0.229) (0.979) 
Diffuse resource share  2.642***  -2.301***  2.266*** -1.532** 3.071***  -3.278* 
  (0.361) (0.700)  (0.385) (0.676) (0.684) (1.725) 
Financial  development  -0.862*** -1.519***  -0.895*** -1.485*** -0.876*** -1.271*** 
  (0.064) (0.039)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.080) (0.056) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy  -0.647***  -0.347*** -0.611***  -0.250***  -0.609***  0.148 
  (0.048) (0.057)  (0.053) (0.055) (0.090) (0.161) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.000*** -  0.000*** -  -0.000   
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant -6.258***  -5.701***  -6.235***  -5.763*** -6.246*** -6.075*** 
  (0.061) (0.023)  (0.066) (0.024) (0.109) (0.032) 
         
Observations  2585 2715  2346 2476 1005 1075 
Log likelihood  4712.3  4826.1  4357.4 4503.7 1991.0 2137.1 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Mean equations contain year dummies. Variables in columns 2, 4 and 6 are demeaned by 
country. Distance to nearest navigable river or coast is an observed fixed effect.  vii
Table 7: Counterfactual Experiments for Resource-Rich and Landlocked Africa 










GDP per capita growth      1.49% 4.04% 0.25% -3.79%   
Mean equation        
Average investment share of GDP 1970-2003  0.063** 17.26% 24.45% 14.96% -9.50% 0.59%
Average population growth rate 1970-2003  -0.634*** 1.72% 1.86% 2.75% 0.89% 0.56%
Initial log per capita GDP 1970  -0.018*** 8.362 7.747 7.129 -0.619  -1.12%
Initial human capital 1970  0.002*** 4.140 4.049 1.476 -2.574  0.58%
Volatility (ıi) -1.247*** 4.04% 3.43% 6.02% 2.59% 3.23%
Initial point-source resources 1970  0.063**  4.35% 4.32% 13.13% 8.80%  -0.55%
Initial financial development 1970  -0.023*** 29.07% 26.89% 14.43% -12.47%  -0.29%
                
Variance equation        
Initial point-source resources 1970  1.581*** 4.35% 4.32% 13.13% 8.80% -0.40%  0.50%
Initial diffuse resources 1970  0.765**  7.27% 11.08% 10.52% -0.56% 0.01%  -0.02%
Initial financial development 1970  -1.290*** 29.07% 26.89% 14.43% -12.47% -0.47%  0.58%
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70  -0.689*** 0.374 0.746 0 -0.746 -1.37% 1.70%
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001*** 277.763 90.902 552.571 461.669 -0.87% 1.09%
        
Estimated volatility    4.04% 3.43% 6.02% 2.59% 
Countries   62 4 6     
Note: Resource-rich African counties are: Algeria, Congo, Rep., Ghana, Malawi, Togo, Zambia. Asian Tigers are: South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand. 
        










GDP per capita growth      1.49% 4.04% 0.22% -3.82%   
Mean equation        
Average investment share of GDP 1970-2003  0.063** 17.26% 24.45% 12.13% -12.32% 0.77%
Average population growth rate 1970-2003  -0.634*** 1.72% 1.86% 2.57% 0.71% 0.45%
Initial log per capita GDP 1970  -0.018*** 8.362 7.747 6.744 -1.004  -1.82%
Initial human capital 1970  0.002*** 4.140 4.049 0.874 -3.176  0.72%
Volatility (ıi) -1.247*** 4.04% 3.43% 6.88% 3.45% 4.30%
Initial point-source resources 1970  0.063**  4.35% 4.32% 10.97% 6.65%  -0.42%
Initial financial development 1970  -0.023*** 29.07% 26.89% 12.05% -14.84%  -0.34%
                
Variance equation        
Initial point-source resources 1970  1.581*** 4.35% 4.32% 10.97% 6.65% -0.35%  0.44%
Initial diffuse resources 1970  0.765**  7.27% 11.08% 7.99% -3.09% 0.08%  -0.10%
Initial financial development 1970  -1.290*** 29.07% 26.89% 12.05% -14.84% -0.63%  0.78%
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70  -0.689*** 0.374 0.746 0 -0.746 -1.56% 1.95%
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001*** 277.763 90.902 979.419 888.516 -1.79% 2.24%
        
Estimated volatility    4.04% 3.43% 6.88% 3.45%   
Countries   62 4 5     
Note: Landlocked Africa are: Central African Republic, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Zambia. Asian Tigers are: South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand.viii
Figure 1: Volatile Countries Have Lower Annual Growth in GDP per Capita 
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Figure 2: Resource-Rich Economies Are More Volatile 
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Figure 3: Cumulative density function of volatility of commodity prices 
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Volatility of unanticipated output growth, predicted 1970-2003
Note: RR. Africa = resource-rich Africa; LL. Africa = Landlocked Africa; Asian T. = Asian Tigers, 
corresponding to Table 7. Based on regression 6a of Table 3. 
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Note: Based on regression 8 of Table 3. 